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RECENT CASES
Certiorari-
DISSENT BY SUPREME COURT JUSTICE RAISES
QUESTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE "RULE OF FOUR"
AND THE EFFECT OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Supreme Court heard three Federal Employers' Liability Act
cases 1 on writs of certiorari, granted upon petition of plaintiff employees.
In each the principal question was sufficiency of the evidence. A majority
of the Court, deciding on the merits, reversed the decisions below in two
of the cases and affirmed in the third. Mr. Justice Frankfurter voted to
dismiss all three cases on the ground that certiorari had been improvidently
granted, asserting that his right to dissent on this ground was not foreclosed
by the granting of the writ.2 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting on the merits
of the two cases reversed, agreed with Justice Frankfurter that certiorari
should not have been granted, but argued that voting for dismissal of a
writ after it has been granted violates the Court's announced "rule of
four" 3 and cannot be justified on the basis of an inherent right of dissent.
4
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Webb v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 352 U.S. 512 (1957); Herdnan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 352
U.S. 518 (1957).
A losing party in a state or lower federal court with a case which
presents a federal question not entitling him to an appeal of right,5 may
petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Under its certiorari
jurisdiction set forth in the 1948 Revised Judicial Code,6 the Court need
grant only those petitions which it believes present questions important
1. In the same group was Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352
U.S. 521 (1957), an injury case arising under the Merchant Marine Act, 1920
(Jones Act), 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952), which was reversed in favor
of the plaintiff. The dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Harlan apply to this case as well.
2. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., supra note 1, at 524-58.
3. The "rule of four" is the settled policy of the Supreme Court to grant
writs of certiorari on the affirmative vote of at least four Justices. See the testi-
mony of Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 2176, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1935); Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2060 and S. 2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
29 (1924). See Address by Justice Stone, 14 A.B.A.J. 428, 436 (1928).
4. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 559-64 (1957).
5. Chapter 81 of the 1948 Revised Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-57 (1952),
sets out several classes of cases which the Court must take on appeal, e.g., decisions
invalidating acts of Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1952), and decisions of three
judge courts provided for by acts of Congress. Ibid. See Address by Chief Justice
Vinson, Meeting of the ABA, Sept. 7, 1949, 69 Sup. Ct. v.
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254-57 (1952).
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enough to warrant full hearing on the merits.7 Under the "rule of four" it
has been the Court's invariable practice to grant certiorari upon the affirma-
tive vote of four or more of its members.8 Justice Frankfurter's dissent
poses the problem of whether the Court, having heard a case on its writ of
certiorari, is then free to dispose of it either on its merits or on the appro-
priateness of the grant of certiorari, or whether, absent any intervening
factor,9 the Court must decide the case solely on the merits.10
The Federal Judicial Code 11 and the rules of the Supreme Court 1
2
do not define certiorari; nor do there seem to be any authoritative state-
ments of the effect of granting certiorari.13 One purpose of the Court's
7. "A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance not there-
tofore determined by this court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with applicable decisions of this court.
(b) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided an important
state or territorial question in a way in conflict with applicable state or territorial
law; or has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but
should be, settled by this court; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict
with applicable decisions of this court or has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court's power of supervision." U.S.
Sup. CT. RULE 19-1.
The same general considerations apply to petitions on cases from other federal
courts. U.S. Sup. .CT. RULE 19-2.
8. See note 3 supra.
9. There seems to be no dispute that the Court may properly dismiss a writ
of certiorari as having been improvidently granted when the full hearing discloses
a factor which, had the Court been aware of its existence when deciding whether
to grant certiorari, would have induced a denial of the petition. Thus if the hearing
discloses the lack of questions urged in the petition, differences in states of facts
which resolve apparent conflicts of law, or lack of jurisdiction, the writ may be
dismissed. ROBERTS N & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES § 289 (1936). See also dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in
the instant cases at 559. An extrinsic policy factor which might influence the Court
to dismiss on the ground that certiorari was improvidently granted is the desire to
avoid a split decision on constitutional issues. This factor, however, does not apply
in the instant cases. Cf. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 348
U.S. 880 (1954), rehearing dettied and cert. dismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
10. Two situations are apparent in which the validity of Justice Frankfurter's
position will be crucial. The first is where certiorari has been granted with five
Justices opposed. After hearing, all nine Justices agree that the merits of the case
dictate reversal of the lower court's decision, but the five who opposed granting cer-
tiorari, following the Frankfurter view, vote to dismiss on the ground that certiorari
was improvidently granted. The other situation arises where certiorari has been
granted over the opposition of one member of the Court. Five members, including
the one who opposed certiorari, agree that the merits warrant reversal. However,
if the Justice who opposed certiorari votes for dismissal, the case will be affirmed.
Several variations of the latter situation can be imagined by varying the number
of Justices adhering to the several views.
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254-57 (1952).
12. U.S. Sup. CT. RULES 19-27.
13. Writers describing the Court's certiorari jurisdiction say typically that a
grant of certiorari "brings up the case for review," RoBmTSoN & KIRKHAM, op. cit.
supra note 9, §281, at 532-33, or that certiorari is granted when at least four
members of the Court believe the case presents questions of law of sufficient
importance to require consideration by the Court. See, e.g., Address by Chief Justice
Vinson, Meeting of the ABA, Sept. 7, 1949, 69 Sup. Ct. v.
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wide discretion in its certiorari jurisdiction is to enable the Court to keep
its work load at a level which permits adequate consideration of the cases
that it does decide.14 The effect of granting certiorari should, therefore,
logically reflect timesaving considerations. But comparatively little time
is saved by dismissing a case after review, rather than deciding it, since the
time needed to write the opinion-the only time saved by such a procedure
-is short in proportion to that needed for reading the record and briefs,
hearing arguments and reaching a decision.'5 Furthermore, the probability
of a significant long run saving of time through dismissing some cases after
hearing is slight. That such a practice would deter parties from applying
for certiorari seems doubtful, and any such tendency might be offset by a
more liberal attitude on the part of the Court when deciding petitions for
certiorari, knowing the writs could be dismissed after review. Moreover,
discouraging litigants from petitioning for certiorari by making more
uncertain the effect of granting the writ seems a less satisfactory way of
reducing the work load of the Court than, for example, a thorough screening
of petitions before granting writs of certiorari. The parties have expended
considerable time and money in a case which terminates in a manner really
satisfactory to no one.' 6  And the development of the federal law-the
essence of certiorari jurisdiction-would be better served were the minds
of the whole Court brought to bear on the same issues.
Basic to the "rule of four" is the idea that a question which at least
four members of the Court believe should be heard is important enough to
warrant review.17 This policy is nullified if the Court is to accept a case
on a writ of certiorari and then, after a full review, dismiss by a five to
four vote on the very issue on which it accepted the case. Another reason
for the "rule of four" is that the Court would rather err in the direction of
granting review where the existence of a substantial question of federal law
may be somewhat doubtful than risk missing the question altogether.1 8
14. Address by Chief Justice Vinson, Meeting of the ABA, Sept. 7, 1949, 69
Sup. Ct. v, vi; Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Senator Wheeler, S. Rin'.
No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1937).
15. In those cases affirmed because one member of the Court who would favor
reversal on the merits votes instead to dismiss because certiorari was improvidently
granted, more time may be consumed than had the case been reversed on its merits,
since the process of decision may take longer and three opinions may be written
instead of one or two.
16. See the statement of Mr. Justice Van Devanter in regard to the advantages
of certiorari jurisdiction before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. "One of the
advantages of this discretionary jurisdiction on certiorari is that at the very thresh-
hold it enables the parties to learn whether the Supreme Court is going to take
jurisdiction; whether their affairs shall be held in abeyance for a year or longer
during the pendency of the case, or whether they must accept the decision of the
circuit court of appeals. That is a very real advantage, for, besides providing
[sic] uncertainty and delay in a very large number of cases, it saves a considerable
amount of expense." Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
S. 2060 and S. 2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1924).
17. Id. at 29-30. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in the
instant cases at 560.
18. In the words of Mr. Justice Van Devanter, "[T]he Court desires to be at
fault in taking jurisdiction rather than to be at fault in rejecting it." Hearings
Before the Senate Committee o the Judiciary on S. 2176, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1935); see RoBERTsoN & KIsI-AM, op. cit. supra note 9, §285.
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This consideration is ignored if the "rule of four" does not require a
decision. Mr. justice Frankfurter maintains that the majority must
prevail in deciding what cases and particularly what classes of cases the
Court shall decide.19 In fact the majority have decided by the rules and
procedures announced over the years that the Court will decide cases on
writs of certiorari upon the approval of four or more of its members.
The fact that the required number is four rather than six, five, or three is
immaterial. If a majority of the Court feels that a certain class of cases
should not be heard on the approval of only four members, then a new
rule should be promulgated either for all certiorari cases or for that
particular class. Nor is a right to vote for dismissal after review preserved
by an inherent right of dissent.2° The time for dissent on the question
of granting certiorari is at the meeting where the writ is to be granted or
denied. Once the case has been reviewed, the question is not one of the
propriety of granting certiorari, but one of the merits of the case presented,
and a dissent grounded on the former question is irrelevant.21  It may be
true, as Justice Frankfurter22 and Justice Harlan 2 believe, that the
Supreme Court has been too liberal in granting certiorari in FELA
cases. 24  However, until the proponents of this view are able to win over
a sufficient number of the Court's membership to deny certiorari in those
cases or, by majority action, to establish a new rule, they should be bound
by the "rule of four" to review and decide the cases on their respective
merits.
19. "The 'rule of four' . . . is a working rule devised by the Court as a
practical mode of determining that a case is deserving of review, the theory being
that if four Justices find that a legal question of general importance is raised, that
is ample proof that the question has such importance. This is a fair enough rule
of thumb on the assumption that four Justices find such importance on an individual-
ized screening of the cases sought to be reviewed. The reason for deference to a
minority view no longer holds when a class of litigation is given a special and
privileged position." Instant cases at 529.
20. Justice Frankfurter says that in an individual case a justice is not likely
to dissent after review but will go along with the judgment of the other members
of the Court. But when a class of cases which he believes are not deserving of
review are systematically taken by the Court, a Justice must not forego his right
to dissent. Instant cases at 528-29. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, believes
that the latter type of situation is the one in which nullification of the "rule of four"
may result due to the establishment of lines of cleavage and a continuing alignment
of four Justices favoring certiorari in a class of cases and five opposing certiorari.
Instant cases at 561-62. To say that such a dissent will not occur often does not
justify it. There is risk that other members of the Court ill refuse to forego
their right to dissent in classes of cases which they believe should not be entitled to
certiorari; or in individual cases in which they believe strongly that certiorari
should not have been granted.
21. A dissenting opinion on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is proper.
Whether or not the case is properly before the Court in accordance with applicable
law is a vital point the Court must decide. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educa-
tion, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) ; Adler v. Board of Educ. 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). There can be no question that a case before
the Court on a writ of certiorari is properly there since the exercise of the Court's
discretion in granting certiorari is the only requirement for such review of a federal
case.
22. Instant cases at 525-26.
23. Instant cases at 559.
24. See Note, Supreme Court Certiorari Policy in Cases Arising Under the
FELA, 69 HAxv. L. Rxv. 1441 (1956).
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Constitutional Law-
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ENJOINED BY A FEDERAL
COURT FROM INTERFERING WITH LOCAL
SCHOOL BOARD'S VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATIOIN
Plaintiffs, members of a local school board, voluntarily integrated the
local public school.1 Individuals and organizations in the community,
through threats, persuasion of parents and pupils and inflammatory mass
meetings, coerced the school board into closing the school because of de-
clining attendance and the possibility of violence.2 Plaintiffs, individually
and as members of the school board, sought an injunction in a federal
district court 3 to restrain these individuals and organizations from ob-
structing integration. 4 The district court granted the injunction, and the
circuit court affirmed,0 holding that the federal court had jurisdiction to
issue the injunction.0 Brewer v. Hoxie School District, 238 F.2d 91 (8th
Cir. 1956).
The basic right in aid of which the present injunction was issued is
the right of the individual to equal protection of the laws. The source of
this right is the fourteenth amendment, which is applicable by its terms
only in case of state action.7 In finding jurisdiction to enjoin private ac-
tion, the instant court reasoned that the school board was under a federally
imposed constitutional duty to desegregate and therefore was entitled to a
correlative federal right to be free from interference by private individuals
1. Plaintiffs gave economic reasons as well as respect for the law as reasons for
their desegregation order. Hoxie School District v. Brewer, 137 F. Supp. 364, 365
(E.D. Ark. 1956).
2. For a detailed account of the defendants' conduct, see the district court opinion.
Hoxie School District v. Brewer, 137 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1956).
3. Plaintiffs alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952), which provides
that "the district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $3,000 . . . and arises under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank,
299 U.S. 109 (1936) ; Starin v. City of New York, 115 U.S. 248 (1885).
4. Plaintiffs also sought declaratory judgment. Its denial by the district court
was not appealed. See instant case at 93 n.l.
5. The decree enjoins defendants from "interfering by acts of trespass, boycott
or picketing with the free operation of schools within plaintiffs' jurisdiction; from in
any manner threatening or intimidating the individual plaintiffs; from taling any acts
of any kind whatsoever which seek to compel by force, intimidation, threats or violence
a rescission of the orders heretofore made integrating the public schools of Hoxie."
Instant case at 94.
6. The instant court alternatively based its injunction on the Civil Rights Act,
12 STAT. 284 (1861), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1952). However, application
of this section of the statute has been limited to private invasions of the rights of
individuals incident to United States citizenship. Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284
(7th Cir. 1953). See text and notes at notes 15-21 infra. Use of this section as a
source of jurisdiction to enjoin private invasions of a fourteenth amendment right is
of doubtful validity. See Note, 65 YALE L.J. 630, 653-55 (1956). See also McKay,
"With All Deliberate Speed" A Study of School Desegregatim, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv.
991, 1073-74 (1956).
7. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N or shall any State . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
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in carrying out this duty.8 Heretofore, federal courts have found implied
power to protect the federal government against interference 9 by either
state 10 or individual action.'1 This power has been invoked to protect
federal officers 12 or organizations 13 carrying out federally imposed duties 14
and also to protect private individuals in the exercise of their "rights and
privileges of national citizenship." 15 These rights and privileges are
independent of any protection afforded the individual against state action
by the fourteenth amendment 16 and exist despite the fact that state law
may also afford protection.17 They include the right to vote in a national
election,' 8 to inform the federal government of violations of its laws, 19 to
protection in the custody of a United States marshal,2 0 to hold federal
office and to petition Congress for a redress of grievances. 2 ' Until the
instant case federal protection had never been extended to a state against
private interference.
The issue raised by the instant case is whether federal jurisdiction to
enjoin the recounted private action exists. Construction of a federal right
in the state agency to be free from private interference represents a con-
clusion that jurisdiction in fact does exist. It does not attempt to meet the
argument that where the basic interest being protected is the individual's
fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the law, federal power
may be exercised only against those who can violate the provisions of that
amendment, i.e., those acting under "color of state law." 2 Under this
view federal prohibition of private action would normally be precluded
8. Instant case at 99. The court stated that the school board's duty arose under
the supremacy clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2, implementing the
fourteenth amendment as interpreted in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
relief granted, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and the corollary constitutional provision requir-
ing state officers to support the Constitution, U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 3.
9. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425-37 (1819) ; Tennessee
v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1879).
10. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1889) ; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 372 (1952) ; In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) ; Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 387 (1879) (dictum).
12. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1889) ; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) ; cf. In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564 (1895).
14. E.g., Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). See text and notes at
notes 18-21 infra.
15. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
16. Id. at 96.
17. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 114 (1945) (concurring opinion);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
18. Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
19. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
20. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 261 (1892).
21. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (dictum) ; United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875) (dictum).
22. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
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even though that action may tend to make moke difficult the state's fulfill-
ment of its constitutional obligationPs Only in the extreme instance where
state enforcement procedures against private obstruction of a school board's
attempts to desegregate are either made unavailable or are ineffectual to
accomplish the school board's objective would federal jurisdiction over
private action be found, on the theory that the state, by abdicating its
functions, had in fact relinquished them to private persons and that the
exercise of those functions by private persons constituted the requisite state
action
2 4
The ultimate question under either the court's reasoning or under the
state action theory is whether the interest in the enforcement of a state's
constitutional obligation to the individual 2 requires federal encroachment
into a matter of state responsibility.26 Recognition of federal jurisdiction
does not mean that its exercise in all situations would be proper.2 7  Several
factors militate toward its use only in extreme instances tantamount to
state refusal to comply with constitutional obligations.28 One is that state
law enforcement agencies will normally be better situated to deal with local
disturbances and, in a federal system, should be given an opportunity to
do so. 9 Another is that integration itself may be better achieved where
popular resentment toward the federal government arising from attempts,
not clearly necessary, to control private conduct is avoided. Still a third
is that the threat of federal action alone may stimulate affirmative state
measures to quell integration disturbances.3 0 In the instant case no
23. The fact that the school board in the instant case was desegregating voluntarily
would not seem a serious obstacle to the issuance of the injunction under the instant
court's rationale since the impact of the Supreme Court decisions on segregation in
the public schools places a practical burden on the school board to integrate irrespective
of whether a district court order has been issued.
24. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944). See also Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105
U. PA. L. Rxv. 213 (1956).
25. By virtue of the Brown decision, a state must integrate its public schools.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The fact that integration is made
difficult by private action would not seem to relieve the state of its duty to integrate,
and its failure to do so would constitute a denial of equal protection. To meet its
constitutional obligation, it would seem that a state must take appropriate measures
against private interference. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
26. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Supreme Court stated
that "school authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing and
solving these problems ... " Id. at 299. The district courts in making their orders
are authorized to consider local problems including the "revision of local laws and
regulations" necessary to achieve integration. Id. at 300-01. Curbing internal violence
would certainly seem to be within the state's responsibility, regardless of the con-
stitutional issues involved.
27. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) ; Railroad Comm'n
v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940). See generally 28 TEXAs L. REv.
410 (1950) ; 53 YALE L.J. 788 (1944) ; 56 HARv. L. Rav. 1162 (1943).
28. Even where it might properly issue an injunction a court of equity may still
deny it if policy or expediency requires the denial. 4 PomERoy, EQuiry JURISPRUDENCE
935 (5th ed. 1941) ; Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525 (1926).
29. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
30. See Note, 65 YALE L.J. 630 (1956).
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demonstration was made jiat state procedures were unavailable or in-
effectual. Presumably, actions would lie in the state court for breach of
the peace 3 ' and for an injunction against continuing trespass. 32  These,
coupled with state executive action, might have sufficed. Under these
circumstances, though the federal court may have had jurisdiction to act,as
the propriety of its exercise is in doubt.34
Constitutional Law-
STATE COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT DEFENDANT
SERVING AS OWN COUNSEL TO ATTEND HEARING
RECORDING TRANSCRIPT FOR APPEAL NOT
VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Defendant was sentenced to death for committing two felonies.1 The
court reporter having died, the trial court appointed a substitute to tran-
scribe the record for appeal. The substitute reporter submitted a rough
draft, after which a hearing was held to assure that the transcript was
accurate.2 The court did not permit defendant, who had acted as his own
counsel at the trial, to attend this hearing personally; but it did offer to
provide other counsel which defendant refused. After exhaustion of state
remedies failed to produce a reversal,3 defendant instituted federal habeas
corpus proceedings. The circuit court, affirming a decision of the district
court, held, inter alia, that the defendant's absence from the hearing did not
31. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-206, 42-211 (1947).
32. 4 PomEaoy, EQuiTY JURiSPRUDENcE § 1357 (5th ed. 1941) and cases cited
therein.
33. Under the court's theory, federal power to issue the injunction against private
individuals would exist independently of any abdication of responsibility by state
authority, whereas under the state action theory, the federal judiciary would not
appear to have jurisdiction until such time as the state authority either refused or was
unable to act.
34. Had the school board alleged a state claim for an injunction in addition to its
federal claim, then the federal court could avoid the constitutional issue, but, neverthe-
less, retain jurisdiction over the state action, as the federal claim would appear to be
substantial. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). But although the federal
court might retain jurisdiction over the state cause, yet it could as a matter of dis-
cretion defer to the state on the state cause of action.
1. There were two separate convictions of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery,
with infliction of bodily harm. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 209 (West 1956). Defendant was
also convicted of auto theft, armed robbery, attempted rape, and forcible acts of
sexual perversion. See People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P2d 1001 (1951);
In re Chessman, 43 Cal. 2d 391, 274 P.2d 645 (1954).
2. The initial reporter's notes were taken in his personal shorthand system which
the defendant contended was undecipherable but which the substitute claimed to be able
to understand. Instant case at 212.
3. People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769 (1950). Even though the
original reporter is unable to transcribe the record for appeal, a defendant is not en-
titled to a new trial as a matter of right so long as an accurate record can be
procured. E.g., State v. Thompson, 130 Mo. 438, 32 S.W. 975 (1895); Moore v.
State, 59 Okla. Crim. 372, 61 P.2d 1134 (1934); State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 258
Pac. 845 (1927). See ORFmLD, CRIMINAL APPEALs IN Av.mcA 142 (1939).
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deny him due process under the fourteenth amendment. Chessman v. Teets,
239 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that in
a criminal case a state provide a hearing that is consonant with the "concept
of ordered liberty." 4 But basic fairness, implicit in this Supreme Court
formulation of the tolerable limits of state conduct, has been held not to
require that a state provide an appeal.5 Some courts have reasoned from
this proposition that appeal procedures are exempt from due process
requirements. 6 In Griffin v. Illinois,7 however, four of the majority justices
held alternatively that constitutional due process does extend to state
appellate proceedings.8 The fifth concurring majority justice did not
reach the issue,9 nor did three of the dissenters,' 0 with the fourth taking
an equivocal position with respect to it." In defendant's prior appeal,'
2
the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, held that due process required
an inquiry by the district court into the defendant's allegation of fraud in
preparation of the transcript at the hearing in question. 13 The Court did
not characterize the proceedings as either trial or appeal.14
Two questions are presented by the instant case: Are the requirements
of due process applicable to a hearing to settle a record? And assuming
that they are, must the defendant be present for due process to be accorded?
Were due process required only of trial proceedings, the usual trial-appeal
dichotomy declaring that trials are concerned with defendant's guilt or
4. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) ; Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S.
309, 335 (1915).
5. Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 435 (1905) ; Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272,
275 (1895) ; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
6. United States v. St. Clair, 42 F.2d 26, 29 (8th Cir. 1930); cf. Lovvorn v.
Johnston, 118 F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 1941).
7. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
8. The Court held that indigent defendants were denied due process and equal
protection of the laws by a state requirement that a transcript accompany all appeals,
which transcript had to be paid for by the appellant except in capital cases.
9. Justice Frankfurter concurred on equal protection grounds. Id. at 20. The
requirement of equal protection applies to all aspects of the determination of criminal
responsibility, including appellate proceedings. Doud v. United States, 340 U.S. 206
(1951) ; Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257-58 (1942). No question of a denial
of equal protection was raised in the instant case. Instant case at 218.
10. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Burton, concurred in by Justices Minton,
Reed and Harlan. 351 U.S. at 26.
11. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. Id. at 29, 36.
12. Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955). On remand the district court found
that there had been no fraud at the hearing on the transcript, and "that the substitute
reporter was exceptionally and especially competent to transcribe the deceased re-
porter's notes . . . and that a fair and correct record was certified." Instant case
at 210. See also the dissent in the denial of the petition for rehearing in the instant
case. Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205, 223 (9th Cir. 1956).
13. Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955). This decision is one of the most
important of recent Supreme Court decisions that have cast doubt on the older view
that appellate procedures are immune from due process. See Frank v. Magnum,
237 U.S. 335 (1915) ; Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273 (1948) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935) ; cf. Taylor v. Ala-
bama, 335 U.S. 252, 254 (1948) ; Paterno v. Lyons, 334 U.S. 314, 319 (1948) ; United
States ex rel. Henson v. Mills, 21 F. Supp. 616, 618 (E.D. Pa. 1937). For similar
discussion of the rights granted under the fifth amendment, see Boykin v. Huff, 121
F2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1941). But see Thompson v. Johnston, 160 F.2d 374 (9th Cir.
1947).
14. Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1956).
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innocence while appeals relate to matters of law 15 would not determine the
nature of the instant hearing and hence would not reveal whether due
process is required or not. The fact that a record is needed for post trial
motions 16 might suggest that the proceedings are part of the trial; but,
since a record is required for an appeal, 17 the proceedings might also be
classified as a portion of the appellate process. However, the Supreme
Court's per curiam opinion in defendant's earlier appeal together with the
Griffin case have vitiated the position that proceedings subsequent to trial
are not governed by due process, thus apparently obviating the need for
categorization of the transcript hearing. In view of the potential injury to
the individual, due process properly should extend to all proceedings that
are a part of the state's determination of criminal responsibility.' s Although
due process may not require that opportunity for appeal be granted, there
should be some assurance that once it is given, it be conducted with at least
minimal standards of fairness, 19 particularly in view of the fact that all
states provide some method of reviewing trial determinations in criminal
cases 2 ° With regard to the instant hearing, the importance of the record
on appeal 2 ' and the possibility of error in its transcription would seem to
dictate that defendant be afforded adequate representation of his interests
in the final settlement of its contents.
The second problem, then, is whether due process requires that de-
fendant, to be adequately represented, must be personally present at the
proceedings. Defendant's principal contention was that the trial judge's
15. Schwab v. Berggen, 143 U.S. 442 (1892) ; Ex parte Smith, 145 Me. 174, 74
A.2d 225 (1950). This formulation has been construed to permit defendant's absence
from portions of the trial that bear no substantial relation to his opportunity to
defend. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (defendant's presence not
necessary for jury view of the scene of the crime). The defendant's presence has
been required in Commonwealth ex rel. Milewski v. Ashe, 363 Pa. 596, 70 A.2d 625
(1950) (at sentencing); State ex rel. Shetsky v. Utecht, 228 Minn. 44, 36 N.W.2d
126 (1949) (at delivery of the verdict) ; State v. Perkins, 32 Wash. 2d 810, 204 P.2d
207 (1949) (at the impanelling of the jury).
16. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181 (West 1956) ; Phillips v. Wheeler, 156 P.2d 468 (Cal.
App. 1921).
17. CAL. RULES ON APPM.x 33(a), (b), 35(b), 36(a), (b). California requires an
appeal in all cases in which the death penalty is imposed. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1239(b)
(West 1956).
18. The Supreme Court has found a state violation of due process to exist only
where the state's conduct is contrary to the "scheme of ordered liberty." Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). This restricted formulation reflects the
court's general attitude in this area, and makes it unlikely that there will be unneces-
sary federal intervention in state proceedings. See also Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). Such restrictive formula-
tions seem to justify the characterization of the Supreme Court as the "identifier" of
problems in state procedures. Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures,
48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16 (1953).
19. Cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956) ; Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
20. ORElD, CRIMINAL APPEALs IN AamucA 301 (1939); Boskey & Pickering,
Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. Cmi. L. REv. 266 (1946).
21. See note 17 supra.
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charge to the jury was not accurately recorded.22 Settlement of the record
required that this and other questions as to what transpired at the trial
be resolved. Were defendant to be represented only by counsel, as the
state urged, he would have the opportunity to submit written affidavits
contesting the rough draft of the transcription.23 His own testimony would
be available by depositions prepared after study of the draft. Any objec-
tions could be raised by his attorney, who would also conduct cross-
examination. In view of the inconvenience and expense to the state in
making defendant personally available and the proper reticence of the
Supreme Court to interfere in state criminal procedures, these safeguards
might appear sufficient to afford defendant due process. But because the
issues at the hearing are factual ones-what transpired at the trial-due
process may require more. The reasons that call for defendant's presence
at the trial seem to call for his presence here as well. As at the trial, due
process may demand that defendant have the right to act as a witness for
himself, thereby affording opportunity to the person who is to resolve the
factual issues to observe his demeanor.2 ' It may also require his presence
in order that he be able to confront those who would contest his assertions
of fact on matters vital to the disposition of the case.25 And finally, because
he, and not his counsel, was present at the trial, it may demand that he be
present to advise counsel on cross-examination; matters which may not
have come to mind when defendant read the rough draft may come to mind
as he hears the statements of others. In balance, these factors would seem
to overcome the inconvenience to the state and the reticence of the federal
judiciary to interfere in state proceedings.
Eminent Domain-
CLAIM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES FOR
PURPOSES OF FEDERAL ANTI-ASSIGNMENT STATUTE
DOES NOT ARISE UNTIL DECLARATION OF
TAKING IS FILED
In 1943 the United States instituted proceedings to condemn a pipe
line easement and was granted an order permitting immediate possession.'
22. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in charging that the jury
must impose the death sentence if they found him guilty rather than that they may
impose the death sentence if they found him guilty. CAL. PEN. CODE § 209 (West
1956). The defendant submitted some two hundred objections to the rough draft of
which forty were accepted. People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769 (1950).
23. People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769 (1950).
24. Cf. McCormick, Evidence 483-87 (1954).
25. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
1. Immediate possession was permitted under the statute authorizing acquisition
of the land. Second War Powers Act, 1942, c. 199, § 201, 56 STAT. 177. Statutory
provision for possession prior to the condemnation of title is not infrequent. See, e.g.,
40 STAT. 911 (1918), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 594 (1952); 40 STAT. 241 (1917), as
amended, 50 U.S.C. § 171 (1952). Prior to the Declaration of Taking Act (see note
2 infra), it was held that even in the absence of express statutory authority the court
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In 1945 one Dow, with knowledge of the proceedings, purchased the land
from the original owner. Subsequently, the Government, acting pursuant
to statute,2 filed a declaration of taking and deposited the estimated com-
pensation with the court. Thereafter, the Government moved for a sum-
mary judgment dismissing the claim of Dow, the purchaser, on the ground
that a sale of the land after the United States had acquired possession was
an assignment of a claim against the United States barred by the federal
Anti-Assignment Act.3 On appeal from a judgment of dismissal, the
circuit court reversed, holding that since the Government was free to
abandon condemnation before filing the declaration of taking,4 the claim
for compensation did not arise until such filing, at which time the purchaser
was the owner of the land. Hence, there was no assignment in contra-
vention of the statute. Dow v. United States, 238 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.
1956).
Once a claim against the United States arises the federal Anti-Assign-
ment Act prohibits its assignment prior to allowance of the claim, ascer-
tainment of the amount due and issuance of a warrant for payment by the
Treasury. In federal eminent domain proceedings the claim for compen-
sation arises when the property is "taken" by the Government,6 and it is
the dating of this event for purposes of the Anti-Assignment Act that poses
the problem of the instant case. In United States v. Dickinson,7 the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a sale of land constituted a
prohibited assignment where the Government had partially submerged the
property prior to the sale.8 The Court noted that to hold otherwise would
compel the owner to institute suit when his land was first invaded, thereby
subjecting himself to the risks of uncertainty of damage and a res judicata
ruling on any later claim.9 More recently, however, the sixth circuit has
stated by way of dictum that in the normal case a claim arises at the time
had the inherent power to grant immediate possession to the Government. Com-
mercial Station Post Office, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.2d 183, 184 (8th Cir. 1931).
A conflict of authority exists on the effect of the act upon this power. Compare United
States v. Fisk Building, 99 F. Supp. 592, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), with United States
v. Parcel of Land, 100 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1951). See also Note, 27 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 423, 426-27 (1952).
2. Declaration of Taking Act, 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §258(a) (1952).
The act provides that the Government may at any time prior to judgment file a
declaration of taking together with a deposit of the estimated compensation due the
owner. Upon filing, title vests in the United States, leaving only the amount of
compensation to be ascertained and awarded in the proceedings. For a discussion of
the operation of the act, see Note, 27 NorE DAME LAW. 423 (1952).
3. REV. STAT. §3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. §203 (1952).
4. See text and notes at notes 17-18 infra.
5. REv. STAT. § 3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. §203 (1952).
6. Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939); 23 Tracts of Land v.
United States, 177 F.2d 967, 969 (6th Cir. 1949). See text and note at note 10 infra.
7. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
8. Id. at 749. The Court refrained from determining when the taking did
occur.
9. Ibid. The pragmatic approach of the Court is illustrated by its characteriza-
tion of a "cause of action" as "one of the most theory-ridden of legal concepts ....
This Court has recognized its 'shifting meanings' and the danger of determining
rights based upon definitions . . . unrelated to the function which the concept
serves in a particular situation." Id. at 748.
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the Government acquires possession rather than upon a subsequent filing of
a declaration of taking.10 In United States v. Certain Lands 11 it was held
that a contract of sale made after entry of an interlocutory judgment of
condemnation, but prior to possession by the United States, was within
the purview of the Anti-Assignment Act because a claim had not yet been
allowed. But the precedent value of this decision is lessened because the
question of whether a claim existed at all at the time of sale was apparently
not litigated, though the court recognized that there had been no "taking." 12
In analogous situations it has been held that in resolving a question of state
taxation the "taking" occurs when the declaration is filed,'8 but in applying
the rule that just compensation is the value at the time of "taking," 14 the
time of entry into possession is determinative. 15
The doctrinal basis of the court's decision in the instant case appears
sound. Until the Government filed the declaration of taking it was free to
abandon the land and discontinue the condemnation proceedings.16 Recon-
ciling a holding that possession created a cause of action in the landowner
with the fact that the Government could thereafter extinguish it by
abandonment is difficult unless a species of inchoate causes of action is to
be recognized for purposes of the Anti-Assignment Act. Although the
court did not expressly rely upon the Declaration of Taking Act -1 which
states that "upon the filing said declaration . . . said lands shall be
deemed to be condemned and taken . . . and the right to just compen-
sation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto.. , .18 its
10. 23 Tracts of Land v. United States, 177 F.2d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 1949). At
the time the Government took possession the claimant was lessee of the land with
an option to purchase. He exercised this option before the declaration of taking
was filed. The court held that under state law he was owner of the land at both
the time of possession and filing. Ibid. Therefore, it was immaterial when the
claim was engendered.
11.46 F. Supp. 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
12. Ibid.
13. United States v. 150.29 Acres of Land, 135 F.2d 878, 880 (7th Cir. 1943).
It should be noted that only partial possession was acquired. This fact may have in-
fluenced the decision. See id. at 881.
14. Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 283 (1939).
15. Anderson v. United States, 179. F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
965 (1950); 11,000 Acres of Land v. United States, 152 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946); see Comparet v. United States, 164 F.2d
452 (10th Cir. 1947). The fact that possession is determinative is based upon the
inequitable results which might obtain were fluctuations in value engendered by the
Government's action to be considered. Anderson v. United States, supra at 283.
The value of the land in this case rose from $227,100 at the time of the entry
to $261,000 at the filing of the declaration of taking. Id. at 282.
16. See 23 Tracts of Land v. United States, 177 F.2d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 1949);
O'Connor v. United States, 155 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1946); Moody v. Wickard,
136 F.2d 801, 803-04 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 775 (1943); United
States v. One Parcel of Land, 131 F. Supp. 443, 445 (D.D.C. 1955). In the
event of abandonment the Government remains liable for the use of the land and
any resulting damage. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 660
(1890) ; Moody v. Wickard, .rupra at 803. The extent of liability is determined and
compensation awarded by the court prior to dismissal. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(i).
See Note, 4 STAN. L. Rev. 266, 274 (1952).
17. 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258(a) (1952).
18. Ibid.
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language also supports a decision that the claim for compensation arises
at the time of filing.' 9 However, because it is doubtful that Congress, in
drafting the act, considered when a claim would arise for assignment
purposes,20 evaluation of the instant case must remain in terms of its
effect upon the policies of the Anti-Assignment statute.
21
Courts have declared the primary purpose of the Anti-Assignment Act
to be the prevention of speculation in claims against the Government by
persons purchasing these claims and exerting political influence to induce
excessive payment.2m Attainment of this end might seem to dictate that
the claim be held to arise at the time the Government has entered into
possession, as any private transaction occurring thereafter will be influenced
by the likelihood that a claim will eventually be pressed against the
Government. In practice, however, whether or not the Anti-Assignment
Act is held to include sales of land subsequent to government possession
will have little effect upon speculation in claims and the exertion of political
influence. Assuming that the purchaser's claim is barred as against the
Government, once the claim is discharged by payment to the former owner
of the land, courts will then enforce the assignment between the private
parties on the theory that the necessity of protecting the Government has
disappeared.2m It is, therefore, still feasible for the purchaser to exert his
influence in favor of the original owner, for he personally derives the benefit
19. The argument that the statutory language compelled the instant decision
was advanced by the purchaser. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 8-9, Dow v. United
States, 238 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1956). In rejecting this proposition the court may
have sought to prevent a conflict with prior decisions which, in identical circum-
stances, held that in valuing the land the "taking" occurs when possession is ac-
quired. See note 15 supra. It could be cogently maintained that if the statute de-
termines the time of taking in the instant situation, it should also apply in cases
of valuation; for to hold otherwise would be to attribute varying meanings to a
single word within a single sentence. In the absence of evidence that such was the
legislative intent, this would contravene the accepted rules of statutory construction.
See McCAFnEY, STATUTORY CONsTucTIoN § 13 (1953). In not basing its decision
upon such restricted grounds, the instant court acted in accord with the proposition
that the concept of taking "is simply a tool . . . in adjusting the relations of
human beings. A choice . . . must be made upon considerations of comparative
usefulness . . . in making such adjustments." McCormack, Legal Concepts in
Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 225 (1931). See note 9 supra.
20. The Senate and House of Representatives reports reveal no such considera-
tions. See H.R. REP. No. 2086, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1930); S. REP. No. 1325, 71st
Cong., 3d Sess. (1931).
21. The purposes of the statute are analyzed and authorities collected in Com-
ment, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 287 (1952). See also Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 692 (1941).
22. United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 291 (1952); United States v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 373 (1949) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United
States, 256 U.S. 655, 657 (1921).
23. Martin v. National Surety Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937); McGowan v. Parish,
237 U.S. 285 (1915); Freedman's Saving and Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S.
494 (1888); United States v. Certain Lands, 49 F. Supp. 962, 965-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) ; cf. Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410 (1899). Contra, National Bank of Com-
merce v. Downie, 218 U.S. 345 (1910); Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U.S. 484 (1878).
The vitality of these latter decisions was extinguished by the Martin case where
the Court stated that "to the extent that the two lines of cases are in conflict, the
[former] . . . must be held to be supported by the better reason." Martin v.
National Surety Co., supra at 597. It might be noted that in neither the Downie
nor Spofford cases had payment been made by the Government. Neither decision,
however, alluded to this fact, although the Court in Martin indicated, but refrained
from drawing, a possible distinction on this ground. Id. at 596.
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of such influence, subject to the risk of collection from the assignor.
24
Thus, the determination of whether the claim arises at the time the
Government obtains possession or subsequent thereto serves only to
determine the time at which a risk of collection from the seller-assignor
may arise. To the extent that delay between initial government possession
and the final acquisition of title increases the speculator's risk of collection
and thereby decreases his willingness to enter into such a transaction, a
finding that the "taking" occurs when the Government enters into posses-
sion would be desirable. In practice, however, the increase in the risk of
collection would probably be so slight as to make the deterrent value of
such a holding minimal.
The Anti-Assignment Act also was intended to protect the Govern-
ment from conflicting claims which would necessitate investigation into the
validity of the assignment, and might subject the Government to increased
litigation and the possibility of multiple liability should the wrong party be
paid.2 If purchasers' claims are to be recognized, an increase in litigation
having some impact upon the Government will result because prior owners
may for a variety of reasons contest the validity of the sale. In this sense
the instant case is not in accord with the policies of the statute. But bal-
anced against possible advantages of deciding that the claim arises at the
time the Government enters into possession is the hindrance to an owner's
ability to convert his property into fluid assets should the need develop,
particularly in view of the probability of an extended period between initial
government action and the ultimate payment 26 upon filing of the declaration
of taking.21 Since the deterrence to speculation achieved by determining
that the claim arises at the time possession is acquired is slight compared
with the gravity of the consequences to the landowner, the instant decision
seems justified.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
TWO YEAR LIMITATION ON SUBSTITUTION OF
PARTIES UNDER RULE 25 (a) (1) HELD INVALID AS
CONTRARY TO FEDERAL RULE MAKING STATUTE
Plaintiff brought suit in a federal district court in 1951 against the
district director of Internal Revenue for repayment of income taxes alleged
24. See Comment, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 287, 290 (1952).
25. United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 291 (1952); United States v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 373 (1949); Martin v. National Surety
Co., 300 U.S. 588, 594 (1937); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 256 U.S.
655, 657 (1921); Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 576 (1886).
26. The order of possession was entered on March 9, 1943, and the declaration
was filed on May 31, 1946. Instant case at 898.
27. The Declaration of Taking Act permits the court to distribute to the claim-
ants the estimated compensation deposited by the Government. 46 STAT. 1421 (1931),
40 U.S.C. §259(a) (1952). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(j).
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to have been erroneously assessed.' Defendant died in 1952. Three years
later plaintiff moved under rule 25(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to substitute the district director's administrator as defendant.
2
The district court denied the motion and dismissed the action on the
ground that substitution had not been made within two years of defendant's
death as required by the rule. The circuit court reversed, holding that
the mandatory two year bar to substitution in rule 25(a) (1) 3 was invalid
because contrary to the Federal Rule Making Statute's requirement 4 that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall not "abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right." 5 Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
1. A taxpayer has a choice of two forums in which to sue for a tax refund:
the United States Court of Claims and the district court. In the Court of Claims
the United States is always the defendant. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584 (1941). If suit is brought in the district court, the plaintiff may choose to
sue either the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1956), or the
district director who collected the taxes. See Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 720 (1866). However, when plaintiff brought his suit in 1951 there
was still a $10,000 jurisdictional limitation on refund suits against the United States
in the district courts. See Judicial Code of 1948, c. 646, § 1346, 62 STAT. 933.
Plaintiff's claim exceeded $10,000. Therefore, to bring his suit in the district court,
it was necessary for him to name the district director as defendant. In 1954, the
jurisdictional limitation was removed, allowing suits for refunds in any amount
to be brought against the United States in the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)
(Supp. IV, 1956). Also, at that time the right to trial by jury which previously
had been available only in the action against the district director was granted for
tax refund suits against the United States in the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2402
(Supp. IV, 1956). See BIcFORD, SUCCESSFUL TAx PRAcrIcE 282-93 (3d ed. 1956);
BRUTON & BRADLEY, FEDERAL TAXATION 39-43 (1955).
2. The action against the district director is res judicata against the United
States. Furthermore, it is defended by United States attorneys and a judgment
will be paid from the United States Treasury. Nevertheless, the courts have
insistently adhered to the fiction that it is a personal action against the district
director. Sage v. United States, 250 U.S. 33, 37 (1919). Therefore, when the
director dies, it is proper to continue the suit against his executor or administrator.
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 612-15 (1902); cf. Union Trust Co. v. Wardell,
258 U.S. 537 (1922) (substitution of successor not allowed). See Plumb, Refund
Suits Against Collectors, 60 HAav. L. REv. 685, 691-92 (1947).
3. "If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court within
two years after the death may order substitution of the proper parties. If substitu-
tion is not so made, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party. The
motion for substitution may be made by the successors or representatives of the de-
ceased party or by any party and, together with the notice of the hearing, shall be
served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons, and may be served in any
judicial district." FED. R. Crv. P. 25(a) (1).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1952).
5. The court also held that because the action was equitable in nature, the ques-
tion of whether to allow substitution would be determined by the doctrine of laches.
Instant case at 114. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), is authority
for the proposition that the validity of a federal rule, promulgated by the Supreme
Court, is a proper subject for judicial review by a lower court. The Sibbach case
held that rule 35, providing for compulsory physical examination of parties, was
valid. The Court emphasized the idea that since rule 35 automatically came into
effect after remaining on the table of the two Houses of Congress without their
disapproval, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1952), Congress apparently thought the rule was
within the scope of the power granted by the Rule Making Statute. 312 U.S. at 15-16.
Justice Frankfurter, in a dissent in which Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy
joined, characterized the inference of tacit approval which the majority drew from
non-objection by Congress as an "appeal to unreality." Id. at 18.
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Those causes of action accruing either for or against a person during
his life which can be enforced after his death are said to survive.
6 Even
though a cause of action survives, a pending suit will be dismissed and a
new suit must be brought with the personal representative of the deceased
as a party,7 unless a statute allows the personal representative to be sub-
stituted in the original suit.8 These statutes eliminate the expense and loss
of time involved in bringing a new suit.9 Since the statute of limitations
may expire during the life of the deceased, but while the suit is pending
or shortly thereafter, substitution statutes also operate to prevent the barring
of the surviving action merely because of the fortuitous death of one of the
parties.10  Most jurisdictions have substitution statutes," some of which
require dismissal if substitution is not effected within a specified period.12
In 1921 section 778 of the Judicial Code re-enacted a federal statute
1
permitting substitution, but added a two year limitation.14 The Federal
Rule Making Statute, enacted in 1934, conferred on the Supreme Court
"the power to prescribe . . . the practice and procedure of the district
courts" by general rules having the force of statutes, provided that "such
rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. . . ." 15
Rule 25(a) (1), promulgated pursuant to the Rule Making Statute, sub-
stantially iterated the substitution provisions of section 778.16 While the
section was in force rule 25(a) (1) was undoubtedly valid, for if it other-
wise would "abridge, enlarge or modify" substantive rights it was sup-
ported by the provisions of that section. 17 However, in the 1948 revision
6. Hooper v. Inhabitants of Gorham, 45 Me. 209 (1858); Harris v. Nashville
Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914). See POLLOCK, TORTS 64-69 (10th
ed. 1916). The question of survival of a cause of action is determined either by
statute or by common law. See PROSSER, TORTS 706-09 (2d ed. 1955).
7. Green v. Watkins, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 260 (1821); Gordon v. Hillman,
109 Wash. 223, 232-33, 186 Pac. 651, 654 (1919).
8. Green v. Watkins, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 260 (1821); Chilcote v. Hoffman,
97 Ohio St 98, 119 N.E. 364 (1918); Gordon v. Hillman, 109 Wash. 223, 186
Pac. 651 (1919).
9. See Ex parte Connaway, 178 U.S. 421 (1900); Gould v. Carr, 33 Fla. 523,
15 So. 259 (1894).
10. See Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503 (1860); cf. Morrison v. Connelly, 13
N.C. 233 (1829) (dictum); Jackson v. Horton, 3 Caines 197 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
(dictum).
11. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN: §§ 3-401, 3-402 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 110,
§ 54 (1956).
12. E.g., ORE. ComP. LAws ANN. §1-311 (1940); WASH. REV. CODE §4.20.050
(1956); cf. Hatch v. Boucher, 77 Conn. 347, 59 Atl. 422 (1904) (statutory time
limit held only to govern time in which substitution may be made as a matter of
right; late substitution permissible at discretion of court).
13. Act of Sept. 24, 1879, c. 20, § 31, 1 STAT. 90.
14. Act of Dec. 22, 1921, c. 18, 42 STAT. 352.
15. 28 U.S.C. §2072 (1952).
16. Under § 778 substitution was accomplished by the writ of scire facias.
Rule 25(a) (1) simplified the procedure by permitting substitution to be made by
motion.
17. In Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482 (1947), decided under rule 25(a) (1)
while § 778 was still in effect, the two year limitation was held to be inflexible,
despite the provisions of rule 6(b), which permit the period specified in the rules
for the doing of any act to be enlarged in the discretion of the court under certain
RECENT CASES
of the Judicial Code Congress repealed section 778,18 expressing the belief
that it had been superseded by rule 25(a) (1).19 The question then arises
whether the Rule Making Statute grants the Supreme Court power to
permit substitution of parties and to bar it after a specified period.
The instant court reasoned that insofar as the rule's two year limitation
placed an inflexible bar to substitution it abridged the plaintiff's "substan-
tive right to bring his civil action to trial on its merits." 20 This reasoning,
however, is based upon what appears to be a fallacious premise. It is
unlikely that Congress meant to define "substantive right" in the Rule
Making Statute as a right to a trial on the merits; this interpretation
would render most, if not all, of the rules invalid, as they necessarily would
"abridge, modify or enlarge" that right. Furthermore, the court failed to
recognize that rule 25 (a) (1), although compelling dismissal of the present
action, does not present an inflexible bar to a new suit against the adminis-
trator to enforce the claim.2' The barring of the subsequent action would
be attributable to the applicable statute of limitations rather than to the rule.
Congress in delegating rule-making power to the Supreme Court must
have realized that any system of procedure requires placing time limitations
on the availability and exercise of its rules, for otherwise litigation would
be interminable. Dismissal, as a sanction to obtain compliance with such
time limitations, is an essential tool of the court. 2 It would seem that
dismissal as a sanction to enforce time limitations on a rule is valid, if the
rule is itself within the power conferred by the Rule Making Statute.
circumstances. Subsequently rule 6(b) was amended to make clear that it did
not apply to rule 25. Concurrently, rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e),
60(b) and 73(a) and (g) were also excepted from 6(b). See 10 FED. RULES
SERv. xci (1946). But see Bush v. Remington-Rand, Inc., 213 F.2d 456, 464 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 861 (1954) (defendant estopped from invoking the protection
of the rule and late substitution permitted).
18. Revision Act of 1948, c. 646, 62 STAT. 869.
19. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 239 (App. 1947). The degree
of significance to be attached to this statement is problematical. Of course, it can-
not by implication extend the scope of the power granted by the Rule Making
Statute. However, on the authority of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), it
might be taken to indicate that Congress believed rule 25(a) (1) to be within the
scope of that power. Yet the liklihood that Congress in making this statement gave
any consideration to the question of the rule's validity would appear so slight as
to make this inference an "appeal to unreality." See dissent of Justice Frankfurter
in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., supra at 18. See also note 5 supra.
20. Instant case at 112.
21. See Bush v. Remington-Rand, Inc., 213 F.2d 456, 464 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 861 (1954) ; Gertler v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 307, 309 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). See also 43 VA. L. REv. 431, 434 (1957) ; text at note 10 supra.
22. The proponents of the Rule Making Statute believed that delegation of the
rule-making power to the Supreme Court would result in a major revision in federal
civil procedure. The Court possesses a competence for formulating procedural rules
and an ability constantly to supervise their operation which Congress lacks, because
of its distance from the problems of the courtroom and its concern with other
matters. These factors suggest that a broad rather than a narrow power was in-
tended. See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387
(1935); Sunderland, Character of the Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme
Court, 21 A.B.A.J. 404 (1935); Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and
its Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J. 772 (1936).
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Substitution seems merely to be a device to facilitate enforcement of rights
that survive, without attempting to determine which rights do in fact
survive. As such, substitution is properly part of adjective law and not
within the classification of "substantive" as envisaged by the Rule Making
Statute.23
23. The distinction between "Substance" and "Procedure" is not easy to draw.
See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333
(1933). "[Mluch of the difficulty [in distinguishing between substantive and
procedural law, arises from the failure . . . to state the problem accurately. Nearly
every discussion seems to proceed on the tacit assumption that the supposed 'line'
between the two categories has some kind of objective existence, so to speak, and that
the object is to find out . . . 'on which side of the line a set of facts falls.' This
way of stating the problem . . . divert[s] our attention from the fact that we are
thinking about the case precisely because there is no 'line' already in 'existence'
which can be 'discovered' by analysis alone." Id. at 335. The article demonstrates
that the distinction is drawn for different purposes in different types of cases. Thus,
the reason for holding that constitutional provisions against retroactive legislation do
not apply to acts which affect procedure alone is that it is not thought to be unfair to
litigants to alter the machinery for the enforcement of their so-called vested sub-
stantive rights. On the other hand, the distinction between "substantive" and "pro-
cedural" law in conflict cases is drawn because it has seemed reasonable to apply
foreign law which has some factual connection with the transaction involved in the
litigation, but unduly inconvenient to the court of the forum to take over all the
machinery of the foreign court. In each case, judicial inquiry should focus on the
purposes for which the distinction is drawn in cases of that nature, rather than to
attempt to find some objective "line" between "substance" and "procedure." Id. at
343-44. In view of the above analysis, determination of the validity of a federal rule
should be based upon an examination of congressional intent. It is reasonable to
believe that the provision against the rules abridging, enlarging or modifying any
substantive right was intended merely to prohibit the making of any rule which
would alter the character of the rights to be determined by a final judgment on the
merits, see Sunderland, supra note 22, at 406, but that the Supreme Court was to be
free to make rules which would regulate all the means and facilities which the courts
make available to enforce those rights as well as the steps individuals must take to
set those means and facilities into action. Ibid. This approximates the interpretation
which had earlier been put upon the rule-making power granted by the English
Judicature and County Courts Acts. Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q.B.D. 329 (1881).
